Recently I read On Liberty by John Stuart Mill. It’s an essay on Political Liberty, or the legitimate limits of the interference of the state with individual people’s freedom. Perusing this masterpiece and juxtaposing its moral philosophy with those of rationalistic philosophers like Immanuel Kant have provided me with a good opportunity to consider such fundamental questions as what it truly means to be a free agent and whether it is possible for us to be free in a true sense. Here I’ do like to share some thoughts on these questions, mainly based on Kantian philosophy.
Freedom is such a familiar concept that we seldom pause to think what it truly means. Once we begin to consider exactly what it is, however, we will realize how elusive a concept it is and how difficult it is to be convinced of its actual existence. For example, I believe that I choose to do whatever I like and that in blogging like this, I am choosing to do so as a free subject. But is it truly so? Am I not just obeying my desire to blog? Is it really possible to say that I’ve chosen to blog and that I’ve been autonomous in that choice?
Indeed, if you begin to consider this kind of problem, you are already standing on the threshold of philosophy, and all you need to plunge into the exciting field is a little courage and leisure. Although the image you have of philosophy may be as a recondite subject, it’s actually far simpler than is commonly supposed, and the problems it deals with are not so different from the ones that every child, with their uncontaminated minds, poses to their puzzled parents. So you don’t need to be afraid of foraying into this riddle-laden field.
Kant’s definition of freedom is extremely stringent. His epistemology makes it impossible to conceive its possibility in the world of experience, where the law of causality reigns supreme, so that nothing can escape from its grip. According to Kantian view, causality is one of those things that make the world of experience possible. So, for something to exist in the sphere of experience entails that it is ruled by the law of causality, or caused by some other thing. But if everything is caused by something, it follows that nothing is unconditioned or that nothing is totally free. That is why freedom is impossible in the realm of possible experience. Nothing or nobody can be truly free in this down-to-earth world. But if so, how is the concept of freedom itself possible?
Practical reason comes in here. It can dictate a priori---or independently of and prior to experience---that so and so ought to be the case. This is the universal moral law. On Kantian view, it is only in our ability to choose to obey this law for its own sake that freedom is possible. For as a rational subject every individual has this transcendental faculty called practical reason, and obeying the rule prescribed by it does not mean obeying some other thing but following our inner rational voice.
Despite the fact that Kant’s moral philosophy is highly intriguing and has indeed inspired such modern thinkers as John Rawls and Michael Sandel, it is untenable from our point of view. It gives reason a privileged status it does not actually have. Though reason is palpably a higher faculty than sensation, still it’s not a metaphysical but an anthropological faculty, and as such requires some biological and sociological foundation. That it is totally unfettered by experience, be it ontogenetic or phylogenetic, is simply inconceivable. But if we reject Kantian moral philosophy on this ground, we have to return to the question: Is freedom really possible? Kant's epistemology is so cogent that it's impossible to completely jettison its basic idea but if we accept its tenet that causality is one of the indispensable components of this empirical world and yet reject Kant's rationalistic account of freedom, we cannot avoid concluding that free will in a true sense is completely impossible. How can we extricate ourselves from this predicament?
I’d like to consider what Mill thinks about this problem next time.
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